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The World Economy 
OVERVIEW 
s l i g h t l y by j u s t under 1%, fo l lowing a 
period of r e la t ive stagnation in the f i r s t 
two quar ters of the year. The growth of 
US o u t p u t , which had been t h e main 
d e p r e s s i n g i n f l u e n c e on a g g r e g a t e 
performance during the e a r l i e r part of the 
year , showed some s igns of improvement. 
US i n d u s t r i a l p roduct ion rose by about 
0.5% be tween t h e second and t h i r d 
quar ters , compared with a f a l l of the same 
magnitude in the second q u a r t e r . The 
European OECD c o u n t r i e s continued t o 
expand, as the b e n e f i t s of lower o i l 
pr ices and i n t e r e s t r a tes began to have an 
impact on domest ic product ion . Third 
q u a r t e r i n d u s t r i a l product ion rose by a 
f u r t h e r 1%, fo l lowing the 0.5$ i n c r e a s e 
during the p rev ious t h r e e months. In 
c o n t r a s t , Japanese output growth became 
t h e m a i n d e p r e s s i n g i n f l u e n c e a s 
i n d u s t r i a l p roduct ion f e l l by more than 
0.5%, r e f l e c t i n g the deflationary effects 
of the high value of the yen. By October 
t o t a l OECD indus t r i a l production had r isen 
by 1.2? d u r i n g t h e p r e c e d i n g t w e l v e 
months, wi th US produc t ion e x h i b i t i n g a 
smal l i n c r e a s e of 0.9%, Japan and West 
Germany's product ion f a l l i n g by 0.9%, in 
both cases, and production in the European 
OECD countries r is ing by 1.8%. 
Fur the r marginal improvements in ou tpu t 
growth, unemployment and the r a t e of 
i n f l a t i o n have been r e c o r d e d a s t h e 
b e n e f i t s of lower o i l p r i c e s and reduced 
inflat ionary expectations worked t h e i r way 
through the world economy. However, the 
con t inu ing c u r r e n t account imbalances 
between the US, Japan and West Germany, 
and the f a i lu re of the pr incipals to reach 
an agreement on the b e s t way of dea l ing 
with them, c o n s t i t u t e the main t h r e a t t o 
t r a d e s t a b i l i t y and f u t u r e economic 
growth. 
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MACROECONOMIC T R E K S 
In the t h i r d q u a r t e r of 1986 i n d u s t r i a l 
production in the OECD countries rose 
The outlook for the US economy i s governed 
by considerable uncertainty. After four 
y e a r s of c o n t i n u e d expansion, growth 
s l a c k e n e d in 1986. Gross n a t i o n a l 
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production (GNP) grew a t a real annual 
r a t e of 3.8%, 0.6%, 2.8% and 1.7%, 
respectively, in successive q u a r t e r s . 
Growth in the third quarter was heavily 
dependent on a rapid increase in car sales 
following the availability of low interest 
loans. The economy therefore grew by 
2.5% during the twelve months to the end 
of 1986, which represents a s ignif icant 
s h o r t f a l l on the US Administration's 
or iginal forecast of 4% for the year. 
The November Commentary noted t h a t 
s u b s e q u e n t e v e n t s had caused the 
government t o r e v i s e i t s growth 
expectations downward, f i r s t to 3.2% and 
then f inal ly to 2.7%. 
The effect of lower oi l prices on the 
domestic o i l industry, weakness in the 
farming sector (as international changes 
occurred in the structure of agriculture) 
and a downturn in gross private domestic 
fixed investment from the fourth quarter 
of 1985, contributed to the fa l te r ing in 
growth. Yet domestic f i na l demand 
remained buoyant, a t l eas t to the third 
quarter of the year. Between the third 
quarters of 1985 and 1986, real GNP rose 
by only 2.3%, whereas domestic demand 
increased by 3.8%. Indeed, during the 
f i r s t three quarters of 1986 real GNP grew 
at an annual r a t e of 1.7% compared with a 
6.2% ra te of growth of domestic demand. 
A substant ial part of demand growth was, 
in consequence, channelled into increased 
net impor t s , r e s u l t i n g in a f u r t he r 
expansion of the trade def ic i t which 
continues to be the principle constraint 
on the growth of domestic demand. 
From l a t e 1979 the d o l l a r r o s e 
substant ial ly against the major trading 
c u r r e n c i e s , reaching a peak a t the 
beginning of 1985. During th i s period 
the deutschemark-dollar rate, for example, 
rose from about 1.7 to 3.4. Since th i s 
app rec i a t ion did not r e f l e c t a r ea l 
improvement in competitiveness but was 
simply the unintended outcome of domestic 
f i sca l and monetary pol ic ies the trade 
def ic i t suffered a marked deterioration. 
From 1982 the annual trade deficit in the 
US rose progressively from US$36.4bn to 
US$124.4bn in 1985. During 1986 the 
deficit increased further to over US$170bn 
and was s t i l l at record levels in the 
t h i r d q u a r t e r of the year when the 
quarterly de f i c i t rose to US$37.67bn, 
compared with outturns of US$36.5bn and 
US$36bn in the f i r s t and second quarters, 
respectively. 
Since the beginning of 1985 the dollar has 
depreciated markedly. Over the period 
the dollar has fallen against the yen and 
deutschemark by over 40% and nearly 50%, 
respectively. After a brief period of 
s t a b i l i s a t i o n the d o l l a r f e l l by 7% 
aga ins t the yen and 9% aga ins t the 
deutschemark in the month to the middle of 
January this year. The apparent failure 
of the trade def ic i t to respond to the 
f a l l in the exchange ra te has led to 
growing protectionist pressures within the 
US which, despite in i t ia l resistance, has 
led the Administration to take a harder 
l i n e with i t s t r ad ing p a r t n e r s and 
m a i n t a i n i t s c a l l s for d o m e s t i c 
reflationary measures by the Japanese and 
West German governments. The recent 
disputes between the US and the EC over 
US gra in s a l e s to Spain and al leged 
excessive government subsidies to the 
European Airbus programme, are evidence of 
th i s tougher trade policy stance. A 
continued lack of improvement in the trade 
d e f i c i t i s l i k e l y to make i t almost 
impossible for the Adminis t ra t ion to 
r e s i s t the impos i t ion of s e l e c t i v e 
protectionist measures or even a general 
import surcharge. However, as noted in 
previous Commentaries, the so-called J-
curve effect, which reflects the prices of 
traded goods reacting more quickly than 
trade volumes to exchange ra te changes, 
suggests tha t the trade balance should 
improve during 1987, and some analysts 
believe that inadequate trade s t a t i s t i c s 
hide an improvement t h a t i s a l ready 
underway. In addition, the ab i l i ty of 
Japanese exporters to the US to absorb the 
dollar price effects of the depreciation, 
by a lowering of previously high prof i t 
margins, has been severely eroded by the 
continuing effect of the appreciating yen 
on prof i t margins. Increases in the 
dollar prices of Japanese products should 
serve to switch some US domestic demand 
away from these goods, which in 1985 
accounted for 19.4% of US imports. 
Further improvements in the US trade 
deficit will follow if proposals to reduce 
the US Budget de f ic i t , and hence the 
domestic savings shortfall, (see November 
Commentary are real ised. The Budget 
presented by President Reagan to Congress 
at the beginning of January envisages a 
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reduction in the def ic i t from the record 
US$220.7bn reached in the 1986 fiscal year 
to US$173.2bn in f i sca l year 1987 which 
began l a s t October. The pro jec ted 
deficit for fiscal year 1988 of US$107.8bn 
is just below the target set by the Gramm-
Rudman-Hollins budget reform law, but many 
analysts believe that the projection i s 
based on a mixture of both c r e a t i v e 
accounting and over-optimistic assumptions 
about US economic growth. Nevertheless, 
with projected reductions in the Budget 
deficit and the recent, expected downturn 
in consumer spending, there are fears for 
US growth despite the US Administration's 
fo recas t of a 3.2% r a t e of expansion 
during 1987, and the big increase in the 
index of leading economic indicators in 
December. The outcome depends crucially 
on what happens to the trade deficit. 
After falling by 0.4% in the f i rs t quarter 
of 1986, Japanese real GNP rose by 0.9% 
and 0.6% in the second and third quarters, 
respectively. Growth in the Japanese 
economy continues to be constrained due to 
the de f l a t i ona ry e f f e c t s of the 40% 
appreciation of the yen against the dollar 
since the second quarter of 1985. By 
October of l a s t year both indust r ia l 
production and manufacturing output had 
declined by 0.9% and 1%, respectively, 
over the preceding twelve months. Non-
exporting sectors, on the other hand, have 
p robab ly b e n e f i t e d from the c o s t 
r e d u c t i o n s f o l l o w i n g t h e y e n ' s 
appreciation and lower oil prices. Real 
income gains have been sluggish because 
the lower o i l p r i ce has not ye t fed 
through to consumer p r i c e s , although 
producer p r i ce s have c l e a r l y been 
affected. Increased public investment 
has also favoured the non-manufacturing 
sector. Export volumes have continued to 
decline and import volumes increase, but 
the J-curve effects of the appreciating 
yen produced successive increases in the 
current account surplus throughout 1986. 
By the third quarter the surplus stood at 
US$24.2bn, almost twice as high as the 
f i rs t quarter surplus, indicating a record 
US$90bn surplus for f i sca l year 1986. 
Experts predict a gradual reversal of this 
trend as the J-curve effects unwind or if, 
the yen s t ab i l i s e s against the dol lar , 
although the current account surplus i s 
s t i l l expected to be nearer US$90bn rather 
than US$80bn in fiscal year 1987. 
Pressure on the Japanese Government to 
stimulate the growth of domestic demand 
has continued. Following the reduction 
in the off ic ia l discount ra te in three 
success ive s t ages , from 5% to 3.5%, 
between January and July 1986, a further 
cut of 0.5% points occurred after the 
Baker/Miyazawa currency s t ab i l i sa t ion 
accord last October. Further declines in 
the yen-dollar ra te to Y150 led to a 
reaffirmation of th i s agreement at a 
meeting between Mr Miyazawa and Mr Baker 
in l a t e January of t h i s year and a 
subsequent cut in the discount ra te to 
2.5%. But most experts believe that the 
cut w i l l have l i t t l e impact in raising 
domestic demand. The government's 
proposed budget for f iscal year 1987 
provides l i t t l e stimulus to the economy 
and the government now appears to 
recognise that a further f iscal stimulus 
wi l l be required, both to prevent the 
effects of the appreciating yen from 
precipitating a deflationary spiral and to 
f o r e s t a l l fu r ther US c r i t i c i s m and 
p o s s i b l e p r o t e c t i o n i s t measu re s . 
However, i t i s expected that l i t t l e can be 
done before April. In the meantime, on 
current policies, the economy is expected 
to grow by l i t t l e more in fiscal year 1967 
than the anticipated 2.2% achieved during 
fiscal year 1986. 
In January, severe downward pressure on 
the French f r anc r e l a t i v e to the 
deutschemark spread to other currencies in 
the European Monetary System (EMS) and led 
to a dec i s ion by the West German 
Government to revalue the deutschemark 
against other EMS currencies. A cut in 
key interest rates of 0.5% points followed 
an attempt to r e s t r i c t the r i se of the 
deutschemark which had stayed firm in the 
EMS despite the revaluation. Funds had 
moved into deutschemarks as the dollar 
f e l l . The Bundesbank also moved to 
increase i t s control over monetary growth 
by squeezing excess l iqu id i ty with a 10% 
inc rease in bank's minimum reserve 
requirements and a DM8bn reduction in 
rediscount f a c i l i t i e s . Many observers 
s t i l l believe that current and projected 
growth i s s t i l l below the economy's 
potent ia l . On current pol ic ies , West 
Germany's five leading economic research 
institutes forecast that growth is likely 
to slow down during the second half of 
1987 as a r e s u l t of the d iminishing 
influence of the reduced price of oil and 
tax cuts. A provisional estimate of 
almost zero economic growth in the fourth 
quarter of 1986 has resulted in four of 
these institutes revising their forecasts 
downwards. The l ikely outturn for 1987 
is now expected to be l i t t l e more than 2%. 
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Owing to J-curve effects and the impact of 
improved terms of trade following lower 
o i l pr ices , West Germany's nominal trade 
surplus rose progressively throughout 
1986, from DM24.9bn, to DM27.9bn and 
DM31.5bn, in the f i r s t , second and third 
quarters respectively. Current forecasts 
suggest that the surplus, on both trade 
and cu r r en t accounts , w i l l only be 
s l ight ly lower during 1987 than in 1986. 
Yet Dr Kohl's coalition, with the election 
victory behind i t , appears s t i l l to be 
res i s t ing pressures for an early f i sca l 
stimulus, largely because of inflationary 
fears and uncertainties about the effects 
of the deutschemark's appreciation on the 
balance of payments. 
comparatively low inf la t ion ra te in the 
US, d e s p i t e the deprec ia t ing dol lar , 
include: the s t i l l low proportion of 
imports to domestic production, and the 
apparent unresponsiveness of earnings and 
pay sett lements to declining real wages. 
US workers, on average, received weekly 
earnings in 1986 which were 8.5% lower in 
real terms than in 1970 and, in 1986, the 
number of US workers who were subject to 
pay cuts or freezes rose markedly. In 
OECD Europe and the EC, where labour 
market conditions are l e s s f lexible , the 
annual rate of inflation to November stood 
at 3.8? and 2.91, respectively, a s l igh t 
reduction on the annual ra tes to August 
reported in the November Commentary. 
Inflation in the world economy continued 
to edge downwards during the l a t t e r part 
of 1986. By November, the rate of change 
in consumer prices over the preceding 
twelve months stood a t 2.2% in OECD 
countries, the lowest ra te since April 
1964. In the year to August the ra te was 
2.4%. S i g n i f i c a n t v a r i a t i o n s in 
i n f l a t i o n r a t e s continue between the 
principal economies of the OECD. Both 
Japan and Germany continue to experience 
negative in f la t ion r a t e s with p r i c e s 
fa l l ing by 0.3% and 1.2%, respectively in 
the year to November. 
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For the US, the r a t e of price change to 
November was s l ight ly lower at 1.3% than 
the 1.6% recorded in the year to August. 
As suggested in the November Commentary, 
the low inflation rate in the US, despite 
s ignif icant f a l l s in the value of the 
dollar, provides further indirect evidence 
of importers into the US responding to the 
dol lar ' s depreciation by reducing profi t 
m a r g i n s . Other r e a s o n s fo r t he 
The future course of o i l prices wi l l 
cont inue to be the key inf luence on 
i n f l a t i o n r a t e s du r ing the y e a r . 
Following the apparent shif t of emphasis 
in Saudi policy towards higher prices 
rather than higher production and recovery 
of market share, the November Commentary 
predicted that the prospect for a longer-
term agreement between OPEC members on 
production leve ls and quotas was more 
probable. At the OPEC meeting in Geneva 
in December, twelve of OPEC's 13 members, 
the exception being Iraq, agreed to limit 
output to 15.8m barrels per day during the 
f i rs t half of 1987 and fix prices around a 
central reference of US$18 a barrel. The 
new agreement compares with a production 
level of 17.3m barrels per day and a price 
per barrel of around US$15 in the weeks 
preceding the agreement. The failure to 
get Iraq to agree to a quota suggests that 
production could in fact be higher than 
the agreed l i m i t , with some r e p o r t s 
suggesting that output could average 16.5m 
barre ls per day if Iraq pumped to i t s 
maximum available export capacity; an 
estimate which assumes that the other 
twelve members of OPEC would not exceed 
the i r quotas. Whether the price wi l l 
stabilise at around US$18 depends not only 
on OPEC product ion but a l so on the 
responses of non-OPEC producers and the 
ra te at which the high levels of stocks 
held by o i l consumers are run down (see 
Oil and Gas sec t ion in I n d u s t r i a l 
Performance). 
LABOUR MARKET 
In the t h i r d q u a r t e r of 1986, the 
standardised rate of unemployment in the 
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OECD countries f e l l s l ight ly to 7.8%, 
compared with 8% and 7.9% in the second 
and f i r s t quarters respectively. In the 
US, the turnround in the downward movement 
of the r a t e , fo l lowing the e a r l i e r 
deceleration in US growth, appears to have 
ceased. Third quarter unemployment fell 
back to 6.8% after successive increases 
from 6.9% in the fourth quarter of 1985 to 
7% and 7.1% in the f i r s t and second 
quarters of 1986. Unemployment in OECD 
Europe and the EC continues to be high and 
largely unchanging, with the third quarter 
ra tes of 10.6% in the former and 11.5% in 
the la t ter , almost identical to the rates 
prevailing on average in both 1984 and 
1985. Within Europe, unemployment 
continued to fal l in West Germany reaching 
8.2% in the third quarter , compared with 
an average of 8.4% during the preceding 
two quarters . France experienced a 
slight increase in unemployment to 10.4%, 
while I t a l i an unemployment fe l l back to 
10.7% from the second quarter peak of 
11.3%. In the UK, the ra te of 11.5% 
represented a s l igh t reduction on the 
previous quarter's f igures. 
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Despite the marked appreciation of the 
yen and the contraction of indust r ia l 
p r o d u c t i o n over the p a s t y e a r , 
unemployment in Japan remains under 3%. 
By November, standardised unemployment 
stood a t 2.8%, 0.1% points lower than the 
average for the third quarter and only 
s l ight ly higher than the 2.6% and 2.7% 
ra tes recorded in the f i r s t and second 
q u a r t e r s . Japan 's a b i l i t y to avoid 
substant ia l lay-offs during periods of 
contraction re f lec t s the flexible labour 
market practices that are a feature of the 
country's indus t r ia l cul ture . Earnings 
flexibility comes from the importance of 
the system of twice-yearly bonus payments 
which accounts for a q u a r t e r of the 
average Japanese worker's annual pay and 
which can readily be adjusted downwards 
when prof i t s f a l l . In addition, the 
principle of flexible job assignments and 
the acceptance of i n t r a - f i r m , and 
sometimes agreed i n t e r - f i r m , work 
mobility, allows workers to be redeployed 
to other tasks. Both features of the 
system provide a buffer which helps to 
preserve jobs without prohibit ive cost 
during times of economic contraction. 
However, the realisation by many Japanese 
companies that the deterioration in their 
international competitiveness is unlikely 
to be reversed for the foreseeable future, 
coupled with projected growth in the 
labour force, may put the system under 
s t ra in . The recent rash of redundancy 
announcements appears to be pointing in 
th is d i rec t ion, but i t i s nevertheless 
clear that many lessons can s t i l l be 
learned in Europe from Japanese labour 
market experience. 
PROGNOSIS 
Recent data suggest that the world economy 
has experienced marginal improvements in 
output growth, unemployment and the rate 
of i n f l a t i o n . Growth in t h e 
industrialised countries has been slow to 
respond to the f a l l in oi l prices and the 
f a l l in i n f l a t i o n a r y expec t a t i ons . 
Despite the f a l l in the d o l l a r , the 
problem of substant ia l current account 
imbalances between the US, Japan and West 
Germany, s t i l l remains. Protec t ionis t 
pressures within the US have increased and 
the US Government has fel t i t necessary to 
adopt a tougher t r ade pol icy s tance 
towards i t s principal trading partners . 
The prospect of the US introducing further 
select ive trade r e s t r i c t i o n s , or even a 
general import surcharge, has undoubtedly 
increased over recent months and remains 
high on the po l i t i c a l agenda. The debt 
problems of the developing countries 
continue, particularly in Latin America, 
although some headway has been made here 
following the agreement in late January to 
reschedule US$4bn of Brazilian debt, and 
Japan's pledge in December to provide 
US$9bn to leading aid agencies. 
Further improvements in growth must be 
expected over the coming months but the 
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benefits of lower oil prices are likely to 
d i s s i p a t e by the middle of the year 
especially if the oil price holds at US$18 
per barrel or above. The fa i lure of the 
US, Japan and West Germany to agree an 
acceptable policy on the most appropriate 
approach to the removal of the current 
account imbalances , c o n s t i t u t e s the 
biggest th rea t to trade s t a b i l i t y and 
world economic growth. In cu r r en t 
circumstances, the pursuit of narrow 
na t iona l s e l f - i n t e r e s t increases the 
likelihood of the world economy slipping 
back in to recession. In the US, the 
ten ta t ive steps that are being taken to 
cut the massive Budget d e f i c i t have 
deflationary implications. I t i s true 
that a reduction in the def ic i t , coupled 
with the recent tax l eg i s la t ion on the 
supply and demand for credit, should exert 
downward pressure on interest rates in the 
US. But the e f f e c t s of high rea l 
interest rates in West Germany and Japan, 
t he d o l l a r ' s d e p r e c i a t i o n and the 
prospective reduction in the US trade 
deficit are likely to reduce the supply of 
foreign capi ta l tending to push up US 
long-term real in te res t r a t es . The US 
economy is therefore balanced on a double-
edged sword i f Budget and trade de f i c i t s 
contract. On the one hand, there are 
the deflationary effects of the declining 
budget de f i c i t and the poss ib i l i ty of 
increased real in te res t r a t e s , against 
which must be set the stimulus to domestic 
economic activity provided by the dollar's 
fa l l . 
The Japanese Government and the West 
German Government, in par t icu lar , s t i l l 
appear re luctant to provide a domestic 
fiscal stimulus of sufficient magnitude to 
prevent further dollar depreciation and/or 
the burden of adjustment fa l l ing heavily 
on the domestic US economy. At the 
exchange ra tes ruling during the l a t t e r 
pa r t of 1986, Lloyds merchant Bank 
ca l cu l a t ed t h a t to achieve a modest 
US$30bn reduction in the trade def ic i t 
over five years, the US economy would have 
to grow at half the ra te achieved in the 
res t of the world. Clearly, in the 
absence of dramatic changes in US relative 
import propensi t ies , at given exchange 
r a t e s , and i f fu r the r exchange r a t e 
i n s t ab i l i t y i s to be avoided, adjustment 
in general, and of the US Budget de f ic i t 
in par t icu la r , would be easier if the 
Japanese and West German's adopted a 
s ignif icant ly more expansionary policy 
s tance . Moreover, fu r ther d o l l a r 
depreciation i s l ikely to have serious 
deflationary implications for both the 
Japanese and West German economies as both 
governments are belatedly beginning to 
realise. The argument, often advanced by 
the West Germans, t ha t the cur ren t 
imbalances are the outcome of US f iscal 
irresponsibility requiring remedial policy 
action solely in the US, f a i l s to allow 
that the most appropriate remedy may not 
simply be a d i rec t reversal of the cause. 
A currency stabilisation agreement between 
the principals, coupled with a commitment 
on f i s c a l expansion by the surp lus 
countries and a more rapid contraction of 
the US Budget deficit, continues to be the 
most pressing requirement in the world 
economy over the coming months. 
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